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The recent dispute between the Reagan administration and Con-
gress over the mining of Nicaraguan ports by CIA-backed "Contra" 
rebels has once again focussed a critical spotlight on the CIA as an 
institution and on American policy for handling these types of low 
intensity conflict. These matters are addressed in a pair of articles in 
this issue. Reflecting on the prevalent fear that American military 
involvement in Central America will lead to "another Vietnam," Sam 
Sarkesian examines American readiness to respond to low intensity 
conflict in light of American traditions and values, perceptions of war, 
and military posture. He concludes that these factors leave the United 
States ill-prepared to deal with revolutionary/counter-revolutionary 
conflicts, and offers a prescriptive framework for analyzing the prob-
lems associated with developing effective responses. Glenn Hastedt 
explores the scope for studying one of America's principal arms of 
low intensity operations — the CIA. Noting the wide availability of 
open literature on the agency, he discusses shortcomings in analysis 
and makes a case for developing conceptual frameworks to facilitate 
objective, scholarly study of this controversial institution. He rounds 
out his argument by discussing two fields of CIA activity — covert 
action and intelligence estimating — which highlight important issues 
and research questions that bear further exploration. 
With the inconclusive Israeli election turning attention once again 
to the unresolved Middle East conflict, Joseph Nevo offers an unique 
perspective on a largely overlooked aspect of Middle Eastern affairs 
— peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan. He compares the 
periods following the 1948 and 1967 wars, and argues that between 
the two wars the stakes had changed and grown; it was much more 
difficult for either country to make peace with the other after the 
second war than it would have been after the first. He concludes that 
any would-be peacemaker must now contend with two dominant fac-
tors: the polarized and intransigent nature of the inter-Arab system, 
and the intractable Palestinian question. Success or failure will depend 
on how these factors are handled. 
The personal security of world leaders is a matter of concern for 
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. As events in 1981 
showed, neither Pope, President nor Peacemaker could take the pro-
tection for granted. A public figure who wishes to be seen by his 
constituency simply cannot be guaranteed foolproof security. Yet, as 
Peter Hoffman's article shows, the same can be said even for a reclu-
sive dictator in a totalitarian state. Adolf Hitler was the target of 
numerous assassination plots during every year of his rule, but the 
protection afforded him was not always of a high quality or consistency 
and Hitler himself often disregarded simple precautions. That Hitler 
survived these attempts is a testament to his incredible luck rather 
than to efficient security. 

